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The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm
for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm)
TPS-Paradigm: Theoretical, metatheoretical
and methodological papers
Empirical studies with
nonhuman primates using the TPS-Paradigm
Personality questionnaires for nonhuman
primates
TPS-Paradigm: Theoretical, metatheoretical and
methodological papers
Research on individual-specificity ("personality"):
Conceptual foundations
- Uher, J. (2018a). Taxonomic models of individual differences: A
guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
- Uher, J., Tofimova, I., Sulis, W.,
Netter, P., Pessoa, L., Posner, M. I., Rotbarth, M.
K., Rusalov, V., Peterson, I. T., & Schmidt, L. A. (2018).
Diversity in action: Exchange of perspectives and reflections on
taxonomies of individual differences. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
- Trofimova, I., Robbins, T.W., Sulis, W., Uher, J. (2018).
Taxonomies of psychological individual differences: Biological
perspectives on millennia-long challenges. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
- Uher, J. (2018c). The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science
Paradigm for Research on Individuals: Foundations for the Science of
Personality and Individual Differences. In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K.
Shackelford (Eds). The SAGE Handbook of Personality and Individual
Differences. Vol. 1. The Science of Personality and Individual
Differences. Part 1: Theoretical Perspectives on Personality and
Individual Differences. (Chapter 4, pp. 84-109). London, UK: Sage.
- Uher, J. (2017). Basic Definitions in Personality Psychology:
Challenges for Conceptual Integrations. European Journal of
Personality, 31, 572-573.
- Uher, J. (2015a). Conceiving "personality": Psychologists’ challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49,398-458.
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Uher, J. (2015b). Developing "personality" taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 531-589.
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Uher, J. (2015c). Interpreting "personality" taxonomies: Why previous models cannot capture individual-specific experiencing, behaviour, functioning and development. Major taxonomic tasks still lay ahead.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 600-655.
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Uher, J. (2014). Fundamental challenges of
contemporary "personality" research.
Physics of Life Reviews, 11, 695-696.
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Uher, J. (2013). Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts reveal only half of the story. Why it is time for a paradigm shift.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47, 1-55.
Observations versus assessments (ratings): Measurement theory,
methodology, methods
-
Uher, J. (2021a). Psychometrics is not
measurement: Unraveling a fundamental misconception in quantitative
psychology and the complex network of its underlying fallacies [Target
article]. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 41,
xx-xx.
- Uher, J. (2021b). Quantitative psychology under scrutiny:
Measurement requires not result-dependent but traceable data
generation. Personality and Individual Differences, 170,
110205.
-
Uher, J.
(2020b). Measurement in metrology, psychology and social sciences:
Data generation traceability and numerical traceability as basic
methodological principles applicable across sciences. Quality &
Quantity. International Journal of Methodology, 54, 975-1004.
-
Uher, J. (2019). Data generation methods across the empirical
sciences: Differences in the study phenomena's accessibility and the
processes of data encoding. Quality & Quantity. International
Journal of Methodology, 53, 221-246.
-
Uher, J. (2018b). Quantitative data from rating scales: An
epistemological and methodological enquiry. Frontiers in
Psychology, 9, 2599, 1-27.
-
Uher, J., & Visalberghi, E. (2016). Observations versus assessments of
personality: A five-method multi-species study reveals numerous biases
in ratings and methodological limitations of standardised assessments. Journal of Research in
Personality, 61, 61-79.
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Uher, J. (2015b). Developing "personality" taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 531-589.
-
Uher, J. (2015c). Interpreting "personality" taxonomies: Why previous models cannot capture individual-specific experiencing, behaviour, functioning and development. Major taxonomic tasks still lay ahead.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 600-655.
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Uher, J. (2015e). Comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations demonstrated in primate behaviour.
In D. Emmans & A. Laihinen (Eds.). Comparative Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging (Vol. 2), Series
Neuropsychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach. (chapter 14, pp.
223-284). Berlin: Lit Verlag.
Comparative research methodologies:
Developing personality taxonomies and models
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Uher, J. (2018a). Taxonomic models of individual differences: A
guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
-
Uher, J. (2015b). Developing "personality" taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 531-589.
-
Uher, J. (2015e). Comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations demonstrated in primate behaviour.
In D. Emmans & A. Laihinen (Eds.). Comparative Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging (Vol. 2), Series
Neuropsychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach. (chapter 14, pp.
223-284). Berlin: Lit Verlag.
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Uher, J. (2011a). Individual behavioral phenotypes: An integrative meta-theoretical framework. Why 'behavioral syndromes' are not analogues of 'personality'.
Developmental Psychobiology, 53, 521–548.
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Uher, J. (2011b). Personality in nonhuman primates: What can we learn from human personality psychology? In A. Weiss, J. King, & L. Murray
(Eds.). Personality and Temperament in Nonhuman Primates (pp. 41-76). New York, NY: Springer.
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Uher, J. (2008a). Comparative personality research: Methodological approaches (Target article). European Journal of Personality, 22, 427-455.
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Uher, J. (2008b). Three methodological core issues of comparative personality research. European Journal of Personality, 22, 475-496.
Behavioural Repertoire x Behavioural Situations Approach (BRxBS-Approach)
-
Uher, J. (2018a). Taxonomic models of individual differences: A
guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
-
Uher, J. (2015b). Developing "personality" taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 531-589.
-
Uher, J. (2011a). Individual behavioral phenotypes: An integrative meta-theoretical framework. Why 'behavioral syndromes' are not analogues of 'personality'.
Developmental Psychobiology, 53, 521–548.
-
Uher, J. (2011b). Personality in nonhuman primates: What can we learn from human personality psychology? In A. Weiss, J. King, & L. Murray
(Eds.). Personality and Temperament in Nonhuman Primates (pp. 41-76). New York, NY: Springer.
-
Uher, J. (2008a). Comparative personality research: Methodological approaches (Target article). European Journal of Personality, 22, 427-455.
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Uher, J. (2008b). Three methodological core issues of comparative personality research. European Journal of Personality, 22, 475-496.
Research on individuals -
Particular challenges of psychology
-
Uher, J. (2021c). Psychology’s status as a science:
Peculiarities and intrinsic challenges. Moving beyond its current
deadlock towards conceptual integration. Integrative Psychological
and Behavioral Science.
-
Uher, J. (2020a). Human uniqueness explored
from the uniquely human perspective: Epistemological and
methodological challenges. Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, 50, 20-24.
-
Uher. J. (2016b). What is behaviour? And (when) is language
behaviour? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 46,
475-501.
-
Uher, J. (2016a). Exploring the workings of the psyche: Metatheoretical and methodological foundation. In J. Valsiner, G. Marsico, N. Chaudhary, T. Sato, and V. Dazzani (Eds.).
Psychology as the Science of Human Being: the Yokohama Manifesto. Annals of theoretical psychology, Vol 13 (pp. 299-324). Cham, Springer International.
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Uher, J. (2015d). Agency enabled by the psyche: Explorations using the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. In C. W. Gruber, M. G. Clark, S. H. Klempe and J. Valsiner (Eds.).
Constraints of Agency: Explorations of Theory in Everyday Life. Annals of theoretical psychology, Vol 12
(pp. 177-228). Cham, Springer International
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Publication abstracts and PDF-Downloads
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Uher, J. (2021a). Psychometrics is not
measurement: Unraveling a fundamental misconception in quantitative
psychology and the complex network of its underlying fallacies
[Target article]. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology, 41, xx-xx.
https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000176
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Psychometrics has always been confronted with fundamental criticism,
highlighting serious insufficiencies and fallacies. Many fallacies persist,
however, because each critic explores only some fallacies while still
building on others. This article scrutinizes the epistemological,
metatheoretical, and methodological foundations of psychometrics, revealing
a complex network of numerous conceptual fallacies underlying its framework
of theory and practice. At its core lies a key challenge for psychology: the
necessity to distinguish the phenomena under study from the means used to
explore them (e.g., concepts, methods, data). This distinction is intricate
because concepts constitute psychical phenomena in themselves and many
psychical phenomena are accessible only through language-based methods. The
analyses show how insufficient consideration of this important distinction
and common misconceptions about concepts and language (e.g.,
signifier–referent conflation, reification of constructs) led to conflations
of disparate notions of key terms in psychological measurement (e.g.,
“variables”, “attributes”, “causality”) and numerous interrelated fallacies
(e.g., construct–referent conflation, phenomenon–quality–quantity
conflation, numeral–number conflation). These fallacies are maintained and
masked by repeated conceptual back-and-forth switching between two
incompatible epistemological frameworks, (a) an operationist framework of
data modeling implemented through methodical and statistical operations and
(b) a realist framework of measurement sporadically invoked in theoretical
considerations but neither theoretically elaborated nor empirically
implemented. The analyses demonstrate that psychometrics constitutes only
data modeling but not data generation or even measurement as often assumed
and that analogies to (indirect or fundamental) physical measurement are
mistaken. They provide theoretical support for the increasing criticism of
psychometrics and its use in research and applied contexts. |
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Uher, J. (2021b). Quantitative psychology
under scrutiny: Measurement requires not result-dependent but
traceable data generation. Personality and Individual
Differences, 170,
110205.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110205
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Various lines of critique of quantitative psychology, well-established
and new, are used to trace along the field's typical steps of research a
complex network of misconceptions and fallacies codified in psychological
jargon. The article explores what constructs actually are, why they are
needed in psychology, fallacies and challenges in construct research, and
the crucial role of language. It shows how common misconceptions of language
and concepts mislead psychologists to conflate phenomena, qualities,
quantities and constructs with one another and with their semiotic encodings
in terms, variables and scores. The article clarifies the conceptual
relations between nomological networks, representation theorems and
psychometric modelling. It reveals conflations of disparate notions of
causality and unobservability, and erroneous equations of nomological
networks with semantic networks, description with explanation, and
measurement theories with explanatory theories. Instead of establishing
causal measurand-result relations, common practices match data generation to
the results rather than the phenomena and properties studied. Mathematical
meaning for scores is often created from differences between individuals and
between different phenomena and properties, which constitute mere conceptual
entities and cannot reflect magnitudes attributable to individuals. This
entails biased inferences on the actual study phenomena and shows that
replicability problems may be even larger than assumed. |
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Uher, J. (2021c). Psychology’s status as a
science: Peculiarities and intrinsic challenges. Moving beyond its
current deadlock towards conceptual integration. Integrative
Psychological and Behavioral Science.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09545-0
[Download]
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Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences. Yet even
after 140 years as an independent discipline, psychology is still struggling
with its most basic foundations. Its key phenomena, mind and behaviour, are
poorly defined (and their definition instead often delegated to neuroscience
or philosophy) while specific terms and constructs proliferate. A unified
theoretical framework has not been developed and its categorisation as a
‘soft science’ ascribes to psychology a lower level of scientificity. The
article traces these problems to the peculiarities of psychology’s study
phenomena, their interrelations with and centrality to everyday knowledge
and language (which may explain the proliferation and unclarity of terms and
concepts), as well as to their complex relations with other study phenomena.
It shows that adequate explorations of such diverse kinds of phenomena and
their interrelations with the most elusive of all—immediate
experience—inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms,
theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the
natural sciences. Their systematic integration within just one discipline,
made necessary by these phenomena’s joint emergence in the single individual
as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest
science of all. But Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of
today’s psychology into a science of populations rather than individuals,
showing that blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced
but impeded the development of psychology as a science. Finally, the article
introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for
conceptual integration and new developments. |
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Uher, J. (2020b). Measurement in metrology, psychology and social
sciences: Data generation
traceability and numerical traceability
as basic methodological principles applicable across sciences.
Quality & Quantity. International Journal of Methodology, 54,
975-1004.
DOI: 10.1007/s11135-020-00970-2
[Download]
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Measurement creates trustworthy quantifications. But unified frameworks
applicable to all sciences are still lacking and discipline-specific terms,
concepts and practices hamper mutual understanding and identification of
commonalities and differences. Transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science
analyses are used to compare metrologists’ structural framework of physical
measurement with psychologists’ and social scientists’ fiat measurement of
constructs. The analyses explore the functions that measuring instruments
and measurement-executing persons in themselves fulfil in data generation
processes, and identify two basic methodological principles critical for
measurement. (1) Data generation traceability requires that numerical
assignments depend on the properties to be quantified in the study objects
(object-dependence). Therefore, scientists must establish unbroken
documented connection chains that directly link (via different steps) the
quantitative entity to be measured in the study property with the numerical
value assigned to it, thereby making the assignment process fully
transparent, traceable and thus reproducible. (2) Numerical traceability
requires that scientists also directly link the assigned numerical value to
known standards in documented and transparent ways, thereby establishing the
results’ public interpretability (subject-independence). The article
demonstrates how these principles can be meaningfully applied to psychical
and social phenomena, considering their peculiarities and inherent
limitations, revealing that not constructs in themselves but only their
indicators (proxies) can be measured. These foundational concepts allow to
distinguish measurement-based quantifications from other (subjective)
quantifications that may be useful for pragmatic purposes but lack epistemic
authority, which is particularly important for applied (e.g., legal,
clinical) contexts. They also highlight new avenues for establishing
transparency and replicability in empirical sciences. |
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Uher, J. (2020a). Human uniqueness
explored from the uniquely human perspective: Epistemological and
methodological challenges. Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, 50, 20-24.
DOI:
10.1111/jtsb.12232
[Download]
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Exploring human uniqueness encounters fundamental challenges because we
can approach this endeavour only from within our uniquely human perspective.
The intrinsic presumptions that this involves may entail two types of
anthropocentric, ethnocentric, and egocentric biases, which can influence
research on both epistemological and methodological levels. Their impact may
be particularly pronounced if quests for the origins of human sociality are
based only on our knowledge about humans. Tomasello's (2019) research
demonstrates that the comparative study of humans and nonhuman species
offers unique opportunities to explore forms of social cooperation,
underlying cognitive and meta‐cognitive abilities as well as pathways in
their ontological and (possible) phylogenetic development. It also shows
that comparative approaches are essential to unravel the ways in which
humans are indeed unique. But species comparisons are challenged by the need
to consider inherent trade‐offs between achieving operational comparability
in empirical studies and establishing ecological validity for the species
compared—challenges, which analogously occur in comparisons across human
cultures as well. This shows that comparative research can also contribute
meaningfully to methodology development in psychology. |
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Uher, J. (2018b). Quantitative data from
rating scales: An epistemological and methodological enquiry.
Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2599, 1-27.
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02599
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Rating scales are popular methods for generating quantitative data
directly by persons rather than automated technologies. But scholars
increasingly challenge their foundations. This article contributes
epistemological and methodological analyses of the processes involved in
person-generated quantification. They are crucial for measurement because
data analyses can reveal information about study phenomena only if relevant
properties were encoded systematically in the data. The Transdisciplinary
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) is
applied to explore psychological and social-science concepts of measurement
and quantification, including representational measurement theory,
psychometric theories and their precursors in psychophysics. These are
compared to theories from metrology specifying object-dependence of
measurement processes and subject-independence of outcomes as key criteria,
which allow tracing data to the instances measured and the ways they were
quantified. Separate histories notwithstanding, the article’s basic premise
is that general principles of scientific measurement and quantification
should apply to all sciences. It elaborates principles by which these
metrological criteria can be implemented also in psychology and social
sciences, while considering their research objects’ peculiarities.
Application of these principles is illustrated by quantifications of
individual-specific behaviors (‘personality’). The demands rating methods
impose on data-generating persons are deconstructed and compared with the
demands involved in other quantitative methods (e.g., ethological
observations). These analyses highlight problematic requirements for raters.
Rating methods sufficiently specify neither the empirical study phenomena
nor the symbolic systems used as data nor rules of assignment between them.
Instead, pronounced individual differences in raters’ interpretation and use
of items and scales indicate considerable subjectivity in data generation.
Together with recoding scale categories into numbers, this introduces a
twofold break in the traceability of rating data, compromising
interpretability of findings. These insights question common reliability and
validity concepts for ratings and provide novel explanations for
replicability problems. Specifically, rating methods standardize only data
formats but not the actual data generation. Measurement requires data
generation processes to be adapted to the study phenomena’s properties and
the measurement-executing persons’ abilities and interpretations, rather
than to numerical outcome formats facilitating statistical analyses.
Researchers must finally investigate how people actually generate ratings to
specify the representational systems underlying rating data. |
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Uher, J. (2019). Data generation methods across the empirical
sciences: Differences in the study phenomena's accessibility and the
processes of data encoding. Quality & Quantity. International
Journal of Methodology, 53, 221-246.
DOI: 10.1007/s11135-018-0744-3
[Springer Nature SharedIt initiative]
[Highlights]
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Data generation methods differ across the empirical sciences. Today’s
physicists and engineers primarily generate data with automated
technologies. Behavioural, psychological and social scientists explore
phenomena that are not technically accessible (e.g., attitudes, social
beliefs) or only in limited ways (e.g., behaviours) and therefore generate
data primarily with persons. But human abilities are involved in any data
generation, even when technologies are used and developed. This article
explores concepts and methods of data generation of different sciences from
transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science perspectives. It highlights that
empirical data can reveal information about the phenomena under study only
if relevant properties of these phenomena have been encoded systematically
in the data. Metatheoretical concepts and methodological principles are
elaborated that open up new perspectives on methods of data generation
across the empirical sciences, highlighting commonalities and differences in
two pivotal points: (1) in the accessibility that various kinds of phenomena
have for the persons generating the data and for the researchers, and (2),
as a consequence thereof, in the processes involved in the encoding of
information from these phenomena in the signs (symbols) used as data. These
concepts and principles cut across establish method categorisations (e.g.,
human-generated versus instrument-generated data; quantitative versus
qualitative methods), highlighting fundamental issues equally important in
all sciences as well as essential differences. They also provide novel lines
of argumentation that substantiate psychologists’ and social scientists’
increasing criticism of their own disciplines’ focus on
standardised assessment methods and establish connections to concepts of
data generation developed in metrology. |
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Uher, J. (2018a). Taxonomic models of individual differences: A
guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373 (1744).
DOI
10.1098/rstb.2017-0171
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Models and constructs of individual differences are numerous and
diverse. But detecting commonalities, differences and interrelations is
hindered by the common abstract terms (e.g. ‘personality’, ‘temperament’,
‘traits’) that do not reveal the particular phenomena denoted. This article
applies a transdisciplinary paradigm for research on individuals that builds
on complexity theory and epistemological complementarity. Its philosophical,
metatheoretical and methodological frameworks provide concepts to
differentiate various kinds of phenomena (e.g. physiology, behaviour,
psyche, language). They are used to scrutinize the field’s basic concepts
and to elaborate methodological foundations for taxonomizing individual
variations in humans and other species. This guide to developing
comprehensive and representative models explores the decisions taxonomists
must make about which individual variations to include, which to retain and
how to model them. Selection and reduction approaches from various
disciplines are classified by their underlying rationales, pinpointing
possibilities and limitations. Analyses highlight that individuals’
complexity cannot be captured by one universal model. Instead, multiple
models phenotypically taxonomizing different kinds of variability in
different kinds of phenomena are needed to explore their causal and
functional interrelations and ontogenetic development that are then modelled
in integrative and explanatory taxonomies. This research agenda requires the
expertise of many disciplines and is inherently transdisciplinary. |
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Uher, J., Tofimova, I., Sulis, W., Netter, P., Pessoa, L.,
Posner, M. I., Rothbart, M. K., Rusalov, V., Petersen, I. T., &
Schmidt, L. A. (2018). Diversity in action: Exchange of perspectives
and reflections on taxonomies of individual differences.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 373 (1744).
DOI
10.1098/rstb.2017-0172
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Throughout the last 2500 years, the classification of individual
differences in healthy people and their extreme expressions inmental
disorders has remained one of the most difficult challenges in science that
affects our ability to explore individuals’ functioning, underlying
psychobiological processes and pathways of development. To facilitate
analyses of the principles required for studying individual
differences, this theme issue brought together prominent scholars from
diverse backgrounds of which many bring unique combinations of
cross-disciplinary experiences and perspectives that help establish
connections and promote exchange across disciplines. This final paper
presents brief commentaries of some of our authors and further scholars
exchanging perspectives and reflecting on the contributions of this theme
issue. |
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Trofimova, I., Robbins, T.W., Sulis, W., Uher, J. (2018).
Taxonomies of psychological individual differences: Biological
perspectives on millennia-long challenges. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373 (1744).
DOI
10.1098/rstb.2017-0152
[Download]
[Highlights]
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This Editorial highlights a unique focus of this theme issue on the
biological perspectives in deriving psychological taxonomies coming from
neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, genetics, psychiatry,
developmental and comparative psychology—as contrasted to more common
discussions of socio-cultural concepts (personality) and methods (lexical
approach). It points out the importance of the distinction between
temperament and personality for studies in human and animal differential
psychophysiology, psychiatry and psycho-pharmacology, sport and animal
practices during the past century. It also highlights the inability of
common statistical methods to handle nonlinear, feedback, contingent,
dynamical and multi-level relationships between psychophysiological systems
of consistent psychological traits discussed in this theme issue. This
article is part of the theme issue ‘Diverse perspectives on diversity:
Multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies
of individual differences’. |
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Uher, J. (2018c). The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on
Individuals: Foundations for the Science of Personality and
Individual Differences. In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds).
The SAGE Handbook of Personality and Individual Differences.
Vol. 1. The Science of Personality and Individual Differences. Part 1: Theoretical Perspectives on Personality and Individual Differences
(Chapter 4, pp. 84-109).
London, UK: Sage.
DOI: 10.4135/9781526451163.n4
[Download]
[Highlights]
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The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on
Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) builds on established concepts, approaches, and
methods from various disciplines that are systematically integrated into
coherent philosophical, metatheoretical, and methodological frameworks and
that are further developed and complemented by novel ones. The TPS-Paradigm
is aimed at supporting scientists exploring individuals to tackle the
particular challenges of their field and to make explicit and critically
reflect on their philosophical presuppositions, metatheories, and
methodologies. The metatheoretical definition of 'personality' as
individual-specificity is elaborated, highlighting that 'personality' is
conceived and studied differently because different paradigms focus on
individual-specificity in different kinds of phenomena. Critical analyses of
the field's strong reliance on assessments methods reveal fallacies,
circular explanations in 'trait' concepts, and the fact that taxonomic
models of most of the phenomena in which individual-specificity is conceived
as 'personality' still need to be developed. The TPS-Paradigm is therefore
aimed at reviving and broadening the portfolio of methodologies that can and
should be complementarily applied to comprehensively explore individuals and
their 'personality.' Such broad paradigms are needed to enable
transdisciplinary collaboration and research that embraces the complex
reality of individuals and their 'personality.' |
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Uher, J. (2017). Basic Definitions in
Personality Psychology: Challenges for Conceptual Integrations.
European Journal of Personality, 31, 572-573.
DOI:
10.1002/per.2128
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Personality psychology is fragmented across heterogeneous subfields
each focussing on particular aspects of individuals and from particular
paradigmatic perspectives. Attempts for integration into overarching
theories as that presented in the target article are therefore important.
But the ideas proposed build on vague and often circular definitions of
basic terms and concepts that hamper advancement and integration. My
critique from philosophy-of-science perspectives pinpoints central problems
and presents alternative concepts to help overcome them. A metatheoretical
definition highlights the core ideas underlying common personality concepts
and opens new avenues for conceptual integration. |
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Uher, J. (2016b). What is behaviour? And
(when) is language behaviour? Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, 46, 475-501.
DOI:
10.1111/jtsb.12104
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Behaviour is central to many fields, but metatheoretical definitions specifying the most basic assumptions about what is considered behaviour and what is not are largely lacking. This transdisciplinary research explores the challenges in defining behaviour, highlighting anthropocentric biases and a frequent lack of differentiation from physiological and psychical phenomena. To meet these challenges, the article elaborates a metatheoretical definition of behaviour that is applicable across disciplines and that allows behaviours to be differentiated from other kinds of phenomena. This definition is used to explore the phenomena of language and to scrutinise whether and under what conditions language can be considered behaviour and why. The metatheoretical concept of two different levels of meaning conveyed in language is introduced, highlighting that language inherently relies on behaviours and that the content of what-is-being-said, in and of itself, can constitute (interpersonal) behaviour under particular conditions. The analyses reveal the ways in which language meaningfully extends humans' behavioural possibilities, pushing them far beyond anything enabled by non-language behaviours. These novel metatheoretical concepts can complement and expand on existing theories about behaviour and language and contribute a novel piece of theoretical explanation regarding the crucial role that language has played in human evolution. |
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Uher, J. (2016a). Exploring the workings
of the psyche: Metatheoretical and methodological foundation. In J.
Valsiner, G. Marsico, N. Chaudhary, T. Sato, and V. Dazzani (Eds.).
Psychology as the Science of Human Being: the Yokohama Manifesto.
Annals of theoretical psychology, Vol 13 (pp. 299-324). Cham,
Springer International.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21094-0_18 [Highlights]
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Introspection is considered a key method for exploring the workings of the psyche because psychical phenomena are accessible only by the individual him- or herself. But this epistemological concept, despite its importance, remained unclear and contentious. Its scientificity is often questioned, but still introspective findings from psychophysics are widely accepted as the ultimate proof of the quantifiability of psychical phenomena. Not everything going on in individuals' minds is considered introspection, but clear criteria that qualify explorations as introspective are still missing. This research applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) to metatheoretically define the peculiarities of psychical phenomena of which various kinds are differentiated and to derive therefrom basic methodological principles and criteria applicable to any investigation. Building on these foundations, the TPS-Paradigm introduces the concepts of introquestion versus extroquestion and reveals that introspection cannot be clearly differentiated from extrospection and that psychophysical experiments and some first-person perspective methods are not introspective as often assumed. The chapter explores the challenges that arise from the fact that psychical phenomena can be explored only indirectly through individuals' behavioural and semiotic externalisations and scrutinises what, when, where and how to externalise in introquestive explorations. The basic principles and criteria elaborated also allow for determining which kind of psychical phenomenon can be explored by using which kind of method for establishing an appropriate phenomenon-methodology match. |
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Uher, J., & Visalberghi, E. (2016). Observations
versus assessments of personality: A five-method multi-species study
reveals numerous biases in ratings and methodological limitations of
standardised assessments. Journal of Research in Personality, 61,
61-79.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jrp.2016.02.003 [Download] [Supplemental
Material]
[Highlights] |
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Personality assessments and observations were contrasted by applying a philosophy-of-science paradigm and a study of 49 human raters and 150 capuchin monkeys. Twenty constructs were operationalised with 146 behavioural measurements in 17 situations to study capuchins' individual-specific behaviours and with assessments on trait-adjective and behaviour-descriptive verb items to study raters' pertinent mental representations. Analyses of reliability, cross-method coherence, taxonomic structures and demographic associations highlighted substantial biases in assessments. Deviations from observations are located in human impression formation, stereotypical biases and the findings that raters interpret standardised items differently and that assessments cannot generate scientific quantifications or capture behaviour. These issues have important implications for the interpretation of findings from assessments and provide an explanation for their frequent lack of replicability. |
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Uher, J. (2015a). Conceiving
"personality": Psychologists’ challenges and basic
fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for
Research on Individuals. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral
Science, 49, 398-458.
DOI:
10.1007/s12124-014-9283-1
[Download]
[Highlights] |
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Scientists exploring individuals, as such scientists are individuals
themselves and thus not independent from their objects of research,
encounter profound challenges; in particular, high risks for anthropo-,
ethno- and ego-centric biases and various fallacies in reasoning. The
Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on
Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) aims to tackle these challenges by exploring
and making explicit the philosophical presuppositions that are being made
and the metatheories and methodologies that are used in the field. This
article introduces basic fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm including the
epistemological principle of complementarity and metatheoretical concepts
for exploring individuals as living organisms. Centrally, the TPS-Paradigm
considers three metatheoretical properties (spatial location in relation
to individuals’ bodies, temporal extension, and physicality versus
“non-physicality”) that can be conceived in different forms for
various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals (morphology,
physiology, behaviour, the psyche, semiotic representations, artificially
modified outer appearances and contexts). These properties, as they
determine the phenomena’s accessibility in everyday life and research,
are used to elaborate philosophy-of-science foundations and to derive
general methodological implications for the elementary problem of
phenomenon-methodology matching and for scientific quantification of the
various kinds of phenomena studied. On the basis of these foundations, the
article explores the metatheories and methodologies that are used or
needed to empirically study each given kind of phenomenon in individuals
in general. Building on these general implications, the article
derives special implications for exploring individuals’
“personality”, which the TPS-Paradigm conceives of as individual-specificity
in all of the
various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals. |
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Uher, J. (2015b). Developing "personality"
taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying
selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 531-589.
DOI:
10.1007/s12124-014-9280-4
[Download]
[Highlights] |
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Taxonomic “personality” models are widely used in research and
applied fields. This article applies the Transdisciplinary
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm)
to scrutinise the three methodological steps that are required for
developing comprehensive “personality” taxonomies: 1)
the approaches used to select the phenomena and events to be studied, 2)
the methods used to generate data about the selected phenomena and events
and 3) the
reduction principles used to extract the “most important”
individual-specific variations for constructing “personality”
taxonomies. Analyses of some currently popular taxonomies reveal frequent
mismatches between the researchers’ explicit and implicit metatheories
about “personality” and the abilities of previous methodologies to
capture the particular kinds of phenomena toward which they are targeted.
Serious deficiencies that preclude scientific
quantifications are identified in standardised questionnaires,
psychology’s established standard method of investigation. These
mismatches and deficiencies derive from the lack of an explicit
formulation and critical reflection on the philosophical and
metatheoretical assumptions being made by scientists and from the
established practice of radically matching the methodological tools to
researchers’ preconceived ideas and to pre-existing statistical theories
rather than to the particular phenomena and individuals under study. These
findings raise serious doubts about the ability of previous taxonomies to
appropriately and comprehensively reflect the phenomena towards which they
are targeted and the structures of individual-specificity occurring in
them. The article elaborates and illustrates with empirical examples
methodological principles that allow researchers to appropriately meet the
metatheoretical requirements and that are suitable for comprehensively
exploring individuals' “personality”.
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Uher, J. (2015c). Interpreting "personality"
taxonomies: Why previous models cannot capture individual-specific
experiencing, behaviour, functioning and development. Major taxonomic tasks still lay
ahead. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49,
600-655.
DOI:
10.1007/s12124-014-9281-3
[Download]
[Highlights] |
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As science seeks to make generalisations, a science of individual
peculiarities encounters intricate challenges. This article explores these
challenges by applying the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science
Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm)
and by exploring taxonomic “personality” research as an example.
Analyses of researchers’ interpretations of the taxonomic
“personality” models, constructs and data that have been generated in
the field reveal widespread erroneous assumptions about the abilities of
previous methodologies to appropriately represent individual-specificity
in the targeted phenomena. These assumptions, rooted in everyday thinking,
fail to consider that individual-specificity and others’ minds cannot be
directly perceived, that abstract descriptions cannot serve as causal
explanations, that between-individual structures cannot be isomorphic to
within-individual structures, and that knowledge of compositional
structures cannot explain the process structures of their functioning and
development. These erroneous assumptions and serious methodological
deficiencies in widely used standardised questionnaires have effectively
prevented psychologists from establishing taxonomies that can
comprehensively model individual-specificity in most of the kinds of
phenomena explored as “personality”, especially in experiencing and
behaviour and in individuals' functioning and development. Contrary to
previous assumptions, it is not universal models but rather different
kinds of taxonomic models that are required for each of the different
kinds of phenomena, variations and structures that are commonly conceived
of as “personality”. Consequently, to comprehensively explore individuals
and individual-specificity, researchers have to apply a portfolio
of complementary
methodologies and develop different kinds of taxonomies, most of
which have yet to be developed. Closing, the article derives some
meta-desiderata for future research on individuals' “personality”.
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Uher, J. (2015d). Agency
enabled by the psyche: Explorations using the Transdisciplinary
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. In C. W. Gruber,
M. G. Clark, S. H. Klempe & J. Valsiner (Eds.). Constraints of Agency:
Explorations of Theory in Everyday Life. Annals of theoretical psychology,
Vol 12 (pp. 177-228). Cham, Springer
International
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-10130-9_13
[Highlights] |
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A science of the individual encounters the unparalleled challenges of exploring the unique phenomena of the psyche and their workings. This article applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) to specify these challenges. Considering three metatheoretical
properties—1) location in relation to the individual’s body, 2) temporal extension and
3) physicality versus “non-physicality”—that can be conceived for various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals
(e.g. behaviours, experiencings, semiotic representations), the TPS-Paradigm scrutinises these phenomena’s perceptibility by individuals. From this metatheoretical perspective, the article traces developmental pathways in which psychical phenomena enable individuals to increasingly become actors—as single individuals, communities and species. The explorations first follow microgenetic and ontogenetic pathways in the development of perceptual and
psychical representations of the physical phenomena encountered in life. Then the article explores how individually developed psychical properties, which are perceptible only by the individual him- or herself, can be communicated to other individuals and how individuals can develop psychical representations that are socially shared, thus enabling social coordination and the transmission of knowledge to subsequent generations. Many species have evolved abilities for co-constructing psychical representations reactively and based on occasions
(e.g. observational learning). The evolution of abilities for co-constructing psychical representations also actively and based on intentions
(e.g. instructed learning) entailed the development of semiotic representations through the creation of behavioural and material signs
(e.g. language), allowing humans to communicate systematically about psychical abilities despite their imperceptibility by other individuals. This has opened up new pathways through which inventions can be propagated and continuously refined, thus producing cultural evolution. These processes enable humans to develop ever more complex psychical abilities and to become actors in the evolution of life. |
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Uher, J. (2015e). Comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations demonstrated in primate behaviour.
In D. Emmans & A. Laihinen (Eds.). Comparative
Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging (Vol. 2), Series Neuropsychology:
An Interdisciplinary Approach (Chapter 14, pp.
223-284). Berlin: Lit Verlag.
ISBN
978-3-643-90653-3
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3848.8169
[Download]
[Online] |
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Individuals are explored in various kinds of phenomena and contexts. But how can scientists compare individual variations across phenomena with heterogeneous properties that require different methods for their exploration? How can measurements of individual variations be made directly comparable between different studies, groups of individuals or even species? This research applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) to elaborate metatheoretical concepts and analytical methodologies for quantitative comparisons of individual variations within and across situations, groups and species using behavioural phenomena as examples. Established concepts from personality psychology, differential psychology and cross-cultural and cross-species research are systematically integrated into coherent frameworks and extended by adding concepts for comparing individual-specific variations (i.e., “personality”) between species. Basic principles for establishing the functional comparability of behavioural and situational categories are elaborated while considering that individuals from different groups and species often show different behaviours and encounter different situations and therefore cannot be studied with identical variables as is done in assessment-based research. Building on these principles, the chapter explores methodologies for the statistical analyses of the configurational comparability of constructs and of mean-level differences between groups and species. It highlights that situational properties are crucial for quantitative comparisons of individual variations. Fundamental differences between observational methods and assessment methods are explored, revealing serious limitations and fallacies inherent to comparisons of individuals on the basis of assessments. Implementations of the methodological principles and concepts presented are illustrated with behavioural data from four primate species (weeper capuchins, mandrills, toque macaques and rhesus macaques). |
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Uher, J. (2014). Fundamental challenges of contemporary
"personality" research (Comment). Physics of Life
Reviews, 11, 695-696. DOI:
10.1016/j.plrev.2014.10.005
[Download]
[Highlights]
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The growing interest in “personality” from scientists of ever more diverse fields demands conceptual integrations—and reveals fundamental challenges. For what is “personality” given that “it” is explored in humans and nonhuman species, that people encode “it” in their everyday language, scientists seek “it” in the brain and study “it” primarily with rating scales? |
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Uher,
J. (2013). Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts
reveal only half of the story. Why it is time for a paradigm shift. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral
Science, 47, 1-55. DOI:
10.1007/s12124-013-9230-6
[Download] [Highlights] |
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This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for
personality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical
approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail.
One of the field's most important guiding scientific assumptions, the
lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-theoretical viewpoints to reveal
that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena that must be clearly
differentiated:
1) lexical repertoires and the representations that they encode
and
2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far,
personality psychologists largely explored only the former, but have
seriously neglected studying the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of
these different kinds of phenomena and their distinct natures,
commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality
psychology's focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait
concepts entails
a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the
phenomena being studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed
and interpreted,
b) that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on
everyday psychological knowledge, and
c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used
in trait psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread
assumptions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena
described by prominent personality models. The current state of knowledge
about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and implications for personality
psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future research are outlined
to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substantially
hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field. |
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Uher, J. (2011a). Individual behavioral phenotypes: An
integrative meta-theoretical framework. Why 'behavioral syndromes'
are not analogues of 'personality'. Developmental Psychobiology,
53, 521–548.
DOI: 10.1002/dev.20544 [Download]
[Highlights] |
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Animal researchers are increasingly interested in individual
differences in behavior. Their interpretation as meaningful differences in
behavioral strategies stable over time and across contexts, adaptive,
heritable, and acted upon by natural selection has triggered new
theoretical developments. However, the analytical approaches used to
explore behavioral data still address population-level phenomena, and
statistical methods suitable to analyze individual behavior are
rarely applied. I discuss fundamental investigative principles and
analytical approaches to explore whether, in what ways, and under which
conditions individual behavioral differences are actually meaningful. I
elaborate the meta-theoretical ideas underlying common theoretical
concepts and integrate them into an overarching meta-theoretical and
methodological framework. This unravels commonalities and differences, and
shows that assumptions of analogy to concepts of human personality are not
always warranted and that some theoretical developments may be based on
methodological artifacts. Yet, my results also highlight possible
directions for new theoretical developments in animal behavior research. |
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Uher, J. (2011b). Personality in nonhuman primates: What can we learn from human personality psychology?
In A. Weiss, J. King, & L. Murray (Eds.). Personality and
Temperament in Nonhuman
Primates (pp. 41-76). New York, NY: Springer. DOI:
10.1007/978-1-4614-0176-6_3
[Download]
[Highlights]
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Primate personality research encounters a number of puzzling methodological challenges. Individuals are unique and comparable at the same time. They are characterized by relatively stable individual-specific behavioral patterns that often show only moderate consistency across situations. Personality is assumed to be temporally stable, yet equally incorporates long-term change and development. These are all déjà-vus from human personality psychology. In this chapter, I present classical theories of personality psychology and discuss their suitability for nonhuman species. Using examples from nonhuman primates, I explain basic theoretical concepts, methodological approaches, and methods of measurement of empirical personality research. I place special emphasis on theoretical concepts and methodologies for comparisons of personality variation among populations, such as among species. |
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Uher, J. (2008a). Comparative
personality research: Methodological approaches (Target article).
European Journal of Personality, 22, 427-455.
DOI:
10.1002/per.680
[Download] [Highlights] |
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In the broadest sense, personality refers to stable inter-individual variability in behavioural organisation within a particular population. Researching personality in human as well as nonhuman species provides unique possibilities for comparisons across species with different phylogenies, ecologies and social systems. It also allows insights into mechanisms and processes of the evolution of population differences within and between species. The enormous diversity across species entails particular challenges to methodology. This paper explores theoretical approaches and analytical methods of deriving dimensions of inter-individual variability on different population levels from a personality trait perspective. The existing diversity suggests that some populations, especially some species, may exhibit different or even unique trait domains. Therefore, a methodology is needed that identifies ecologically valid and comprehensive representations of the personality variation within each population. I taxonomise and compare current approaches in their suitability for this task. I propose a new bottom-up approach - the behavioural repertoire approach - that is tailored to the specific methodological requirements of comparative personality research. Initial empirical results in nonhuman primates emphasise the viability of this approach and highlight interesting implications for human personality research. |
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Uher, J. (2008b). Three methodological core
issues in comparative personality research.
European Journal of Personality, 22, 475-496.
DOI:
10.1002/per.688 [Download] [Highlights] |
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Comparative personality research in human and nonhuman species advances many areas of empirical and theoretical research. The methodological foundations underlying these attempts to explain personality, however, remain an unpopular and often ignored topic. The target article and this rejoinder explore three methodological core issues in the philosophy of science for comparative personality research: Conceptualising personality variation, identifying domains of variation, and measuring variation. Clear distinctions among these issues may help to avoid misunderstandings among different disciplines concerned with personality. |
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